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Substance abuse, whether of alcohol or drugs, in our society has
reached epidemic proportions. The workplace is no exception. Indeed,
substance abuse by employees infects every sector of the American work-
place: Professional, managerial, and hourly. A confidential survey by the
National Cocaine Helpline showed that seventy-five percent of those sur-
veyed used drugs on the job, fourty-four percent dealt drugs to fellow
employees, and twenty-five percent reported daily drug use at work.' Af-
ter a drug-screening program was implemented by the United States Pos-
tal Service in Philadelphia, 230 job applicants were rejected based upon
the results of their urinalysis tests. 2 In California, when various banks
informed job applicants that all applicants would be screened for drugs,
thirty-five to forty percent failed to return. 3 In NewJersey, an autopsy of
the pilot involved in an airplane crash which killed two crewmen revealed
that the pilot had been smoking marijuana, possibly while flying.4 In San
Jose, California, the police recovered $250,000 worth of computer parts
stolen by Silicon Valley electronics workers attempting to finance their
drug habits.5
In response to this epidemic, employers have turned to workplace
substance abuse testing programs. Although the authors feel employers
have both legal and moral bases for imposing drug tests, such programs
can impinge upon employee privacy rights and civil liberties. This Arti-
cle addresses the legal implications of workplace substance abuse testing
in both the public and private employment sectors. It also examines how
federal and state laws impact on such procedures. The Article consists of
four component parts: Part one examines the impact of substance abuse
testing on employees' privacy rights, Part two looks into the impact of
handicap and discrimination laws, Part three focuses on collective bar-
gaining agreements, and Part four suggests criteria for effective sub-
* The authors are partners in the law firm of Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, which is
engaged exclusively in the practice of labor and employment law on behalf of management through-
out the United States. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Meryl R. Kaynard, associ-
ate, Ilene T. Weisbard, paralegal, and Louis R. Satriale, law clerk, at Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler &
Krupman for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1 O'Boyle, More Firms Require Employee Drg Tests, Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1985, at 6. col. 1.
2 Kerr, Drug Tests Losing Most Court Cases, N.Y. Times, December 11, 1986, at Al, Col. 1.
3 McKenna, Most Banks Reluctant to Test Employees for Drug Use, AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 18, 1985,
at 25. See also Note, Dnrg Testing in the Workplace: A Legislative Proposal to Protect Privacy, 13 J. LEGIs.
269 (1986).
4 Castro, Battling the Enemy H'ithin, TIME, Mar. 17, 1986, at 52.
5 Bishop, Coast Electronics Plants Fighting DrugAbuse Among 1l'orke s, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1985, § 1.
at 5, Col. I.
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stance abuse testing programs in both the public and private sector. The
authors conclude that such testing may be lawfully conducted in both the
public and private sectors within defined parameters.
I. Substance Abuse Testing and Privacy Rights
A. Employer Interests
Employers, whether public or private, have a right to control their
workplace to ensure its efficiency, safety, and in the private sector, profit-
ability. Substance abuse adversely affects all three concerns. In 1986
alone substance abuse cost employers over sixteen billion dollars in lost
productivity. 6 Today's accident rates for substance abusers are three and
one-half times greater than for nonabusers. 7 Industrial accidents (which
normally lead to workers' compensation claims) are likely to occur two or
three times more often with alcoholic employees.8 Absenteeism and tar-
diness is three times greater. 9 Furthermore, the quality of the abuser's
work is generally substandard. 10
In exchange for the employer's right to control the workplace the
law imposes certain duties upon him. The employer's duty to provide
employees with a safe working environment is imposed by statute'I and
common law. 12 Public employers have an additional general duty to pro-
tect the public welfare.13 Substance abuse testing may be undertaken by
employers exercising these rights and discharging these duties. How-
ever, these employer interests must be balanced against the rights of in-
dividual employees.
B. Employee Privacy Rights
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution estab-
lishes, derivatively, a right to privacy.' 4 It prohibits the federal govern-
ment and its agents from engaging in unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 5 The prohibition applies to the states and their agents by vir-
tue of the fourteenth amendment.' 6 It does not apply to private employ-
ers in the absence of "state action."' 7
In determining whether state or federal governmental action violates
the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the courts require the government to demonstrate a legitimate
6 Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace: Cost, Controls, and Controversies (Washington, D.C.:
The Bureau of National Affairs, 1986), at 6-9.
7 Id. at 8.
8 Id. at 7.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 7,9.
11 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
12 Tolbert v. Martin Marietta Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (D. Colo. 1985).
13 Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
14 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Schmnerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
15 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977).
16 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
17 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
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government interest.18 Under this analysis, the government's interest
served by the search or seizure is balanced against the individual's pri-
vacy expectations under the fourth amendment.' 9 Even if the govern-
ment's interest outweighs individual privacy expectations, the courts
must examine the government's specific conduct. The government's
conduct must be substantially related to its stated interest and not overly
intrusive to the individual before the courts will uphold the constitution-
ality of the search or seizure.
20
Courts have found substance abuse testing by public employers to
be a form of search and seizure subject to the restrictions of the fourth
amendment. 21 The ultimate determination of any search's reasonable-
ness requires a judicious balancing of the intrusiveness of the search
against its promotion of a legitimate governmental interest.22 Govern-
ment employees, federal and state, cannot lawfully be subjected to un-
reasonable substance abuse testing programs because of fourth
amendment restrictions. What is unreasonable in a given case depends
upon its facts.
C. Constitutionality of Public Employer Substance Abuse Testing Programs
1. The Government's Legitimate Interest in Implementing Such a
Program
The first factor courts examine is whether the government has a le-
gitimate interest served by the program. The government is most suc-
cessful in meeting this burden in areas where it already extensively
regulates for public safety reasons.
In the recent case of Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District,2 3 the
district court upheld a drug screening program established by the Ne-
braska Public Power District ("NPPD") under which all employees having
access to "protected" areas of a nuclear power plant were subjected to
drug screening randomly or at least once a year.2 4 Employees testing
positively were given the choice of entering an employee assistance pro-
gram or facing disciplinary action, including discharge.25 Two employ-
ees challenged the program on, inter alia, fourth amendment grounds.
The court upheld the program. It found that the government's interest
in operating a safe nuclear power plant outweighed employee privacy ex-
pectations. The court found that such privacy expectations were reduced
by the government's pervasive regulation of nuclear plants.26
The Third Circuit confronted a testing program of the New Jersey
18 Capua, 643 F. Supp at 1513; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 643 F. Supp.
380, 390 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.), emergenc ' stay denied, 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987).
19 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
20 lVolfish, 441 U.S. at 559.
21 Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600
F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
22 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579
(1983).
23 654 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987).
24 Id. at 1516.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1524-25.
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Racing Commission in Shoemaker v. Handel.27 Under the program, the
Commission required jockeys to undergo an urinalysis on a random basis
even in the absence of reasonable suspicion of drug abuse. Here, too,
the court upheld the program, finding that the State's interest in regulat-
ing the racing industry outweighed the jockeys' privacy expectations.
The court noted that the jockeys' privacy expectations were diminished
because the industry is highly regulated and the jockeys are licensed by
the state.
28
A third drug testing case, Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union
(AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 29 concerned the constitutionality of a substance abuse
testing program established by the Chicago Transit Authority. Under
the program, bus drivers were required to submit to blood tests or
urinalysis whenever they were involved in a "serious accident" or sus-
pected of being intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics. 30 The
union challenged the constitutionality of the program on fourth amend-
ment grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the
program. It determined that the Transit Authority's interest in "protect-
ing the public by insuring that bus ... operators are fit to perform their
job . . ." was "paramount" and outweighed any employee expectations
of privacy regarding such tests.
3'
The preceding decisions demonstrate that a legitimate government
interest supports the constitutionality of a substance abuse testing pro-
gram in the public sector. However, such an interest alone does not
guarantee the consitutionality of the program.
2. The Government's Reasonable Suspicion of Substance Abuse
Even where the government has a legitimate interest in undertaking
a substance abuse testing program, it will not always be successful de-
fending it in court. A number of courts have struck down testing pro-
grams as violating the fourth amendment because no reasonable
suspicion of substance abuse by a particular employee was required.
In Capua v. City of Plainfield,32 a district court confronted a substance
abuse testing program implemented by the Plainfield, New Jersey, police
and fire departments. Under the program, all members of both depart-
ments were subject to surprise, mass urinalysis. The City based the pro-
gram upon its conclusion that employing "drug-free" police and fire
fighters was mandated by its duty to protect the public welfare.33
In May 1986, a surprise, mass urinalysis, found traces of drugs in
sixteen members of the Plainfield fire department. All sixteen were ter-
minated without pay.3 4 The sixteen firefighters and one civilian member
27 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
28 Id. at 1142. The NewJersey program also subjected jockeys, trainers, officials and grooms to
take breathalyzer tests when directed by the State Steward. Id. n.1.
29 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
30 Id. at 1266.
31 Id. at 1267.
32 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).




of the police department, who had been suspended for positive test re-
sults, filed suit to overturn their terminations and suspension.3 5 They
challenged the constitutionality of the program as an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs. It found that the program
"sweeps up the innocent with the guilty and willingly sacrifices each indi-
vidual's fourth amendment rights in the name of some larger public in-
terest." 36 The court further found that the "[City] had no general job-
related basis for instituting this mass urinalysis, much less any individual-
ized basis." 37 The court noted that the City had no specific information
or independent knowledge of any of the department members being
under the influence of drugs.3 8 None of the plaintiffs had received prior
warnings for below standard job performance. Nor was there any evi-
dence of an increased incidence of accidents or complaints.3 9 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs' privacy expectations outweighed the state's
interest in implementing the program.40
A second case which initially found a government testing program
unlawful is National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.41 Von Raab in-
volved a substance abuse testing program implemented by the United
States Customs Service pursuant to Executive Order 12,564.42 That Or-
der, signed by President Reagan on September 15, 1986, mandated drug
testing for employees in sensitive jobs involving law enforcement, public
health or safety or national security.43 It further authorized testing for
"nonsensitive" civilian employees where: - (i) there is reasonable suspi-
cion of illegal drug use; (ii) it relates to an accident or unsafe practice; or
(iii) it is in follow-up to rehabilitation for illegal drug use.44 The Order
also requires each government agency to develop its own testing pro-
gram consistent with, among other things, its "mission" and employees'
privacy rights.4
5
Under the program implemented by the Customs Service, all em-
ployees selected for promotion were required to undergo urinalysis. If
they refused, they would not be promoted.46 The specimen was col-
lected in the presence of a customs service "laboratory representative."
The Union challenged the constitutionality of the program on fourth
amendment grounds.
The court found that the urinalysis constituted a "full-blown search"
triggering fourth amendment protections. 47 It then noted that the gov-
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1517.
37 Id. at 1516.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1520.
41 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.), eneigenc ' star denied, 107 S.
Ct. 3182 (1987).
42 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986).
43 Id. 32,892-93.
44 Id. at 32,890.
45 Id.
46 649 F. Supp. at 382.
47 Id. at 386.
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ernment neither had knowledge of nor suspected any employee of selling
or using drugs on the job. Thus, the "search" was made in the total
absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 48 As such, the court
declared that the plan was an "overly intrusive policy of searches and
seizures without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, in violation of
legitimate expectations of privacy and was wholly unconstitutional.-
49 It
characterized the program as "a degrading procedure that so detracts
from human dignity and self-respect that it 'shocks the conscience' and
offends this Court's sense of justice." 50 On appeal, however, the Fifth
Circuit vacated the district court's permanent injunction and reinstated
the Customs Service's drug testing program. 5' Following that decision,
the National Treasury Employees Union applied for an emergency stay
of the Customs Service's drug testing program. The United States
Supreme Court denied the stay on June 1, 1987.52 The question of
whether the testing program is constitutional has yet to be decided by the
Supreme Court.
A New York appellate court struck down a similar mandatory drug
testing program for school teachers in Patchoque-Medford Congress of Teach-
ers v. Board of Education of the Patchoque-Medford Union Free School District.
5
3
Under that program, all probationary school teachers were subject to
mandatory urinalysis before permanent appointment. The teachers'
union attacked the program as an illegal search in violation of the fourth
amendment and as an invasion of privacy. 54 The court held that "the
reasonable suspicion standard is the appropriate basis for constitution-
ally compelling a public school teacher to submit to a urine test for the
purpose of detecting the use of controlled substances." 55
Comparing the cases involving testing by public employers reveals
that a legitimate government interest, supposedly served by testing, will
not always outweigh employee privacy rights. The courts are more likely
to defer to the government interest in cases involving heavily regulated
industries where clear dangers to the public welfare exist. Transporta-
tion and nuclear power appear to be foremost among such industries.
However, even in those industries, it is unsettled whether testing not
based on reasonable suspicion of substance abuse will withstand judicial
scrutiny. In any event, testing based on reasonable suspicion of drug
abuse is far more likely to be upheld on constitutional grounds.
48 Id. at 387.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 388.
51 816 F.2d 170.
52 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987).
53 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
54 Id. at 37, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
55 Id. at 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891. Accord Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005
(D.C. 1985) (upholding a District of Columbia police department program which required reason-
able suspicion before administering a drug test). Cf Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482
(N.D. Ga. 1985) (upholding tests administered in connection with an undercover investigation ofcity
employees suspected of using marijuana on the job). But see McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302
(8th Cir. 1987) (modifying a district court order which required reasonable suspicion, thereby al-
lowing urinalyses uniformly or by systematic random selection of employees having regular contact
with prisoners on a day-to-day basis in medium or maximum security prisons).
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3. The Government's Program is No More Intrusive than Reasonably
Necessary to Serve the Government's Interest
Another factor courts examine is the intrusiveness of the testing pro-
gram. The courts require that the program be no more intrusive than
reasonably necessary to serve the government's interest. The degree of
intrusion engendered by any search must be viewed in the context of the
individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. 56 The test for determining
when an expectation of privacy is legitimate was articulated by Justice
Harlan in Katz v. United States: "IT]here is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as 'reasonable.' "57 This standard is used to differentiate between
levels and degrees of intrusiveness among searches and seizures. "As
measured by the expectation of privacy, inspections of personal effects
are generally least intrusive, while breaches of the 'integrity of the body'
result in the greatest invasion of privacy."58
In summary, a government employer substance abuse testing pro-
gram will most likely pass constitutional muster where: (1) the govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in implementing such a program; (2) the
program is substantially related to that interest; (3) submission is re-
quired only of employees reasonably suspected of substance abuse; and
(4) the program is no more intrusive than reasonably necessary to serve
the government's interest.
D. Constitutionality of Private Employer Substance Abuse Testing Programs
As stated earlier in this Article, the United States Constitution's pro-
hibition of unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply to private
employers in the absence of state action.59 State constitutional provi-
sions protecting the right of privacy are found in Alaska, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and
Washington. 60 Some state constitutions (such as California) prohibit un-
56 Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
57 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
58 Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514.
59 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
60 In determining the elements of a privacy tort, the courts generally look to the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 652A-6521, which defines the relevant torts as follows:
(a) hst rusion upon Seclusion
"One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id. § 652B.
(b) Public Disclosure of Private Facts
"One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to
the public." Id. § 652D.
(c) False Light
"One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the
public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the
false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed." Id.
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reasonable searches and seizures by private, as well as public, employ-
ers. 6t Thus, in those states, the constitutional principles previously
discussed are instructive.
Nevertheless, even in those states whose constitutions do not apply
to private employers, their testing programs will be subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny under federal law where "state action" is found to have
occurred. The courts are most likely to find state action where a private
employer: (1) acts in concert with a law enforcement agency;62 (2) per-
mits the government to hire, promote, terminate, or reinstate the private
employer's employees; or (3) allows its employees to work on govern-
ment property or to use government equipment. 63 In those instances, a
private employer substance abuse testing program will be subject to fed-
eral constitutional standards. Furthermore, at least one state, Utah, has
drafted a statute giving specific guidelines on how private employers are
allowed to conduct drug and alcohol tests. 64 Those guidelines closely
resemble the consitutional limitations described earlier.65
II. Substance Abuse Testing and Handicap or Disability
Discrimination Laws
Absent state action, an applicable state constitution, or a specific
statute, a private employer's substance abuse testing program still poses
problems under federal and state handicap or disability discrimination
61 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. See also White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr.
94 (1975) (public and private employers prohibited from secretly gathering personal information or
from overly broad collection or retention of personal information regarding employees or applicants
unless the employer has a compelling interest).
62 Lehr & Middlebrooks, Workplace Privacy Issues and Employer Screening Policies, EMPLOYEE REL. L.
J. 407, 408 (1985).
63 Id.
64 Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, 1987 Utah Laws § 234 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-38-
I to 34-38-15 (Supp. 1987)).
65 The guidelines set forth in Utah's Drug and Alcohol Testing Act are as follows:
All sample collection and testing for drugs and alcohol under this chapter shall be performed in
accordance with the following conditions:
(1) the collection of samples shall be performed under reasonable and sanitary conditions;
(2) samples shall be collected and tested with due regard to the privacy of the individual
being tested, and in a manner reasonably calculated to prevent substitutions or interference
with the collection or testing of reliable samples;
(3) sample collection shall be documented, and the documentation procedures shall
include:
(a) labeling of samples so as reasonably to preclude the probability of erroneous
identification of test results; and
(b) an opportunity for the employee or prospective employee to provide notification
of any information which he considers relevant to the test, including identification of
currently or recently used prescription or nonprescription drugs, or other relevant
medical information;
(4) sample collection, storage, and transportation to the place of testing shall be per-
formed so as reasonably to preclude the probability of sample contamination or adultera-
tion; and
(5) sample testing shall conform to scientifically accepted analytical methods and proce-
dures. Testing shall include verification or confirmation of any positive test result by gas
chromatography, gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy, or other comparably reliable an-
alytical method, before the result of any test may be used as a basis for any action by an
employer under Section 34-38-8.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-6, as enacted by H.B. 145, L. 1987, effective April 26, 1987.
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laws, and other state statutory and common law. Alcoholism and drug
addiction are handicaps or disabilities under federal law66 and under the
law of most states. 67 Consequently, employer substance abuse testing
programs, whether public or private, may be restricted by handicap or
disability discrimination laws.
A. Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 197368 (Rehabilitation Act) is a
federal law prohibiting discrimination in employment against "otherwise
qualified handicapped individuals" solely on the basis of their handi-
cap. 69 The law applies only to employers with federal contracts 70 and
recipients of federal grants.7 ' Its reach, however, is broader. Many state
handicap discrimination laws are either patterned on or interpreted con-
sistent with the Rehabilitation Act. Those laws are examined in Section
II B of this Article. Two key terms in the Rehabilitation Act, "handi-
capped" and "otherwise qualified," must be examined further.
1. "Handicapped" Defined
The Rehabilitation Act defines a "handicapped individual" as one
"who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."
72
Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1978, adding the following
limitation to the definition of "handicapped individual":
[S]uch term does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or
drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such indi-
vidual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose em-
ployment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would
constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others. 73
To the extent this amendment leaves any doubt that alcohol and
drug addition are handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act, that doubt has
been dispelled by subsequent administrative and judicial interpretations.
The United States Attorney General, in a formal opinion, concluded that
alcohol and drug addiction are handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act.
74
This conclusion has been endorsed by numerous judicial decisions. 75
66 See infra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
68 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982)).
69 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
70 Id. § 793.
71 Id. § 794.
72 Id. § 706(8)(B).
73 Id. (emphasis added).
74 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 12 (1977).
75 See, e.g., Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Tinch v. Wal-
ters, 573 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), aft'd, 765 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub noa.,
Traynor v. Turnage, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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2. "Otherwise Qualified" Defined
The Rehabilitation Act protects from employment discrimination
only those handicapped individuals who are "otherwise qualified". A
handicapped individual is "otherwise qualified" where: (a) notwithstand-
ing the handicap, he or she can perform the essential duties of the job in
question, or (b) is capable of performing those duties with reasonable
accommodation by the employer, provided such accommodation would
not impose an undue hardship on the employer, and (c) his or her per-
formance would not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the
handicapped person or others. 76 Whether a handicapped individual is
"otherwise qualified" is a factual question to be determined on a case-by-
case basis.
77
In Davis v. Bucher,78 the City of Philadelphia promulgated an employ-
ment policy which provided in pertinent part that the City could refuse to
examine a job applicant or could disqualify one who was addicted to al-
cohol or drugs. The plaintiffs were former drug addicts. They claimed
they were denied employment solely on the basis of their past drug abuse
without regard to their qualifications and ability to do the job for which
they applied.79 This, they argued, violated the Rehabilitation Act. The
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment relying on
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare regulations
promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act.80 It found that the plaintiffs
were handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act in that they had records
of prior physical impairment (drug addiction). It further found that the
City's blanket disqualification of the plaintiffs for employment based solely
on those records, and without regard to their abilities to perform the
jobs in question, constituted handicap discrimination in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act.81
The Second Circuit reached a similar result in Whittaker v. Board of
Higher Education .82 There, the New York City Board of Higher Education
denied the plaintiff, a college teacher, tenure and the use of an honorary
title because of his alcoholism. Whittaker challenged the Board's action
under the Rehabilitation Act. He argued that, although he was an alco-
holic, the condition was under control and did not interfere with his abil-
ity to satisfactorily perform the duties of his job. The court agreed,
finding that if the Board's action was based solely on the plaintiff's alco-
holism, without any showing that the impairment prevented him from
performing his job duties, it was handicap discrimination under the Re-
habilitation Act.83
Where, however, alcoholism or drug addiction does prevent an em-
ployee from satisfactorily performing his or her job, a different outcome
76 School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1131 n.17 (1987).
77 Id. at 1311.
78 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
79 Id. at 793.
80 Id. at 796. See also 42 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1977).
81 Id. at 801.
82 461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
83 Id. at 106.
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will result. In Heron v. McGuire,84 a New York City police officer was sus-
pended and subjected to disciplinary proceedings because a sample of
his blood obtained by the police department showed traces of heroin.
The department based the blood test on its suspicion that the officer was
abusing drugs. This suspicion arose when the officer's attendance be-
came erratic and his job performance declined.
85
The officer brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act. He claimed
his heroin addiction was a handicap entitling him to the protection of the
Rehabilitation Act. The court disagreed, finding that the officer's addic-
tion rendered him unfit for police work. Among other things, it "im-
paired . . . his ability to respond to emergency and life threatening
situations." 8 6 The behavioral manifestations of the addiction prevented
the officer's successful performance on the job.8 7 This finding was en-
tirely consistent with, if not mandated by, the 1978 amendment to the
Rehabilitation Act.
88
Since alcohol or drug addiction is a handicap under the Act, any sub-
stance abuse testing by employers covered by the Act is subject to its
provisions and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
3. Substance Abuse Testing Under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Regulations Thereunder
Under the Rehabilitation Act, medical examinations may be con-
ducted in connection with employment decisions, notwithstanding the
Rehabilitation Act's prohibition against handicap discrimination.
89 Of
course, employer actions based on the results of such medical examina-
tions are circumscribed. Thus, for example, an employer may not, solely
because of a handicap revealed during such an examination, deny em-
ployment where: (i) the handicap does not prevent the individual from
performing the essential functions of the job in question; or (ii) reason-
able accommodation of the handicap will enable the individual to per-
form those functions; and (iii) the handicap does not pose a direct threat
to the property or safety of others. 90
The Rehabilitation Act specifies that such examination may take
place after an offer of employment has been made.91 Thus, an employer
may "condition an offer of employment on the results of a medical exam-
ination conducted prior to the employee's entrance on duty."'92 The Re-
habilitation Act also does not appear to prohibit subsequent annual
physicals for all employees. The scope of the physical may be compre-
hensive. At least insofar as private employers are concerned, it may in-
84 802 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1986).
85 Id. at 68.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 69.
88 Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122, 92 Stat. 2984, 2985 (1985) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1987)).
89 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(c) (1986).
90 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
91 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(c) (1986).
92 Id.
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clude substance abuse testing.93 Inclusion of such testing by public sector
employers would be subject to fourth amendment restrictions previously
discussed.
9 4
Applicants or employees should be informed of the purpose of the
test before the actual examination. The test should be to determine
whether the employee or applicant is suffering from any medical condi-
tions that impairs his or her ability to perform the essential duties of the
job in question or would pose a direct threat to the property or safety of
themselves or others. The more prudent course for an employer is to
apprise each individual of the specific conditions (such as substance
abuse) for which the examination will be conducted. The most efficient
means of disclosure would be providing a written list of conditions being
tested for at the time of and immediately prior to the examination. Ab-
sent communication of this information, the employee's consent to the
examination may be uninformed, and therefore ineffective.9 5 Ineffective
consent can result in a claim for battery.
9 6
In addition to such comprehensive physicals by private employers,
specific testing for substance abuse may be conducted any time by public
or private employers where the employer has a reasonable suspicion of
such abuse. The suspicion must be founded upon objective evidence
such as deteriorating job performance, erratic attendance or other simi-
lar behavior.9 7
Consistent with the employer's right to base employment decisions
on the results of the examination, test results should be kept confidential.
Only those managers participating in employment decision making
should have access to the findings. Broader publication could expose
employers to invasion of privacy or defamation claims, depending upon
the nature of the findings and the law of the jurisdiction in question.
Therefore, any analysis of the legal implications of substance abuse test-
ing in the workplace would be incomplete without an overview of perti-
nent state laws.9 8
B. State Handicap Discrimination Laws
An overwhelming majority of states prohibit handicap or disability
employment discrimination by public and private employers. The provi-
sions of those laws vary from state to state. All of the laws reach medical
impairments or conditions. However, the state definition of handicap or
disability can be as broad as those contained in the Rehabilitation Act or
can be narrower. The statutes and administrative interpretations may be
categorized as follows:
93 Association of W. Pulp and Paper Workers v. Boise Cascade Corp., 644 F. Supp. 183 (D.C.
Or. 1986); IBEW Local Union No. 1900 v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 634 F. Supp. 642 (D. Colo.
1986).
94 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV; Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
95 Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
96 Id.
97 McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500
A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
98 See supra notes 64-65 and infra notes 99-103.
[Vol. 62:859
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TESTING
Model A: Some states specifically exclude current substance abus-
ers from their definition of handicap. These include California, Geor-
gia, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and
Virginia.9 9 North Carolina, however, prohibits discrimination based
on an individual's history of drug or alcohol abuse where he or she is
not currently using drugs or alcohol.' 0 0
Model B: Some states protect alcoholics and drug addicts as
handicapped. These states include Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin. 101
Model C: Some states distinguish between addicts, who are cov-
ered by the handicap laws, and "recreational users," who are not
within the ambit of the handicap laws. New Jersey is one example. 10 2
Model D: Some states remain silent on the issue. Such states in-
clude, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee and the District of Columbia.'
0 3
Unless drug and alcohol addiction are expressly excluded from the
ambit of a state's handicap discrimination law, private and public em-
ployers in all states prohibiting handicap or disability discrimination are
well advised to presume alcohol and drug addiction are included under
those laws. Thus, any testing programs in such states should be imple-
mented within the parameters discussed under the Rehabilitation Act,
even though that Act is not itself applicable to those employers who do
not have government contracts or receive federal funds.
C. Reasonable Accommodation
Even though substance abuse testing may be lawfully conducted
within the limitations discussed earlier, actions based upon the testing
results are circumscribed. Adverse employment decisions may not be
based solely on the fact that the individual is an alcohol or drug abuser
where the abuse does not prevent performance of the essential functions
99 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 66-502(2) (Harrison
Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.140(2)(b) (Baldwin 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15(g)
and its interpretation at 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 408 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3(4)(iii) (Supp.
1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-33-560 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. art. 5221k,
§ 2.01(7)(A) (Vernon 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.01-3 (Supp. 1986).
100 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3(4) (Supp. 1985).
101 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-103(l) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 6, § 77
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(16) (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363.01(25a) (West Supp. 1987) (excluding from protection drug or alcohol abuse which prevents a
person from performing the essential functions of the job or constitutes a direct threat to property
or the safety of others); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(21) (McKin-
ney 1982 & Supp. 1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.01 (A) (13) (Anderson 1980); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 28-5-6(7) (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8) (West Supp. 1986).
102 Opinion letter by Pamela S. Poff, Director, State of New Jersey Department of Civil Law and
Public Safety Division on Civil Rights, January 23, 1986.
103 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.20(2) (West 1986);
IDAHO CODE § 56-707 (1976 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-I-3(q)(II) (Supp. 1986); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 3.550 (103) (Callaghan 1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 275-c:I (Purdon 1964 & Supp.
1986); PA. STAT. ANN. § 954 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (Supp.
1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(23) (1981). It should be noted, however, through telephone con-
versations with representatives, that the Connecticut Commission of Human Rights and Opportuni-
ties, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the Florida Commission on Human
Relations have at least indicated that they regard alcohol and/or drug abuse as protected handicaps
(the Florida agency has, thus far, so indicated only for alcoholism).
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of the job in question, or where reasonable accommodation of the condi-
tion will allow the individual to perform those job functions, and does
not pose a direct threat to the property or safety of others.
The Rehabilitation Act and state handicap or disability discrimina-
tion laws impose upon covered employers the duty to reasonably accom-
modate handicapped individuals so as to make available employment and
advancement opportunities. 10 4 Employers are relieved of this duty
where they can show accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business or enterprise. 0 5 In addition, federal
agencies must satisfy the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970106 which requires
federal agencies to provide alcoholism treatment programs for federal
employees. Reading this 1970 statute in conjunction with the Rehabilita-
tion Act makes clear Congress' intent that federal agencies make affirma-
tive efforts to assist alcoholic employees in overcoming their handicap
before undertaking adverse employment action.
The regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act list vari-
ous actions that may be required as reasonable accommodation, depend-
ing upon the circumstances:
(1) [M]aking facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usa-
ble by handicapped persons, and (2) job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar
actions. 107
The above list is merely illustrative, and should not be considered all
inclusive.
In determining whether accommodation would impose undue hard-
ship, the size and type of the employer's operation (including the
number of employees, facilities, and nature of work or services per-
formed) and the nature and cost of the accommodation needed are con-
sidered.108 Several recent cases illustrate the principles of reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship.
In Whitlock v. Donovan,109 an employee of the U.S. Department of
Labor was an alcoholic. The employee's drinking problem seriously af-
fected his work performance and attendance. After experiencing an alco-
holic seizure at work, he was referred by his supervisor for counselling.
After the worker participated in an alcoholism out-patient program, his
attendance and performance improved. However, about three years
later, he relapsed. He was again suspended and referred for counselling
and treatment. Upon his return to work, over the ensuing four-year pe-
riod, the Department took other steps to accommodate his condition. It
104 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1986).
105 Id.
106 Pub. L. No. 91-616, § 201, 84 Stat. 1848, 1849 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 290aa-
290ee (West 1985 & Supp. 1987)).
107 42 U.S.C.A. § 84.12(b)(1), (2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
108 Id. § 84.12(c)(1), (2), (3).




adjusted his work hours so he could continue in a rehabilitation program
and offered to transfer him to a less stressful job. Despite these efforts,
his work record worsened. Eventually, the worker was discharged.
The employee sued the Department under the Rehabilitation Act,
claiming that he was handicapped (alcoholism) and the Department
failed to make reasonable accommodation before firing him. 110 The
court agreed, finding that while the Department treated the employee
with compassion and tolerance, its actions fell short of the Rehabilitation
Act's reasonable accommodation requirement."' Furthermore, the De-
partment had not shown that reasonable accommodation would have im-
posed an undue hardship. 1 2 The employee was allowed to reapply for
employment with the Department subject to a fitness-for-duty examina-
tion. If found fit, he was to be rehired; if not, he was to be paid disability
retirement. 1 3
In another case, Walker v. Weinberger1 4 a recovered alcoholic
brought action against his employer, the United States Department of
Defense. He alleged handicap discrimination in violation of the Rehabili-
tation Act and the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Pre-
vention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act. The employee argued that
the Department did not reasonably accommodate him as mandated by
the two acts.
The Department discharged Walker for repeated absences from his
work as a "printed-materials packer" for the Defense Printing Service
(DPS). The DPS, prior to Walker's termination, gave Walker permission
to be hospitalized under a government alcohol counseling and assistance
program. Thereafter, Walker's problems at work increased. However,
these subsequent problems were unrelated to his alcoholism. In dis-
charging Walker, the Department treated his pre-treatment and post-
treatment absences cumulatively. 15
The court ruled that by considering both pre-treatment and post-
treatment behavior together, the Department failed to reasonably accom-
modate Walker. 16 The court stated that "an agency does not 'reason-
ably accommodate' an alcoholic employee by keeping score of alcohol-
induced, pre-treatment transgressions for purposes of cumulation with
non-alcoholic related misconduct to produce an aggregate disciplinary
record warranting more severe punishment." 17 The court concluded
that reasonable accommodation of an alcoholic employee "requires for-
giveness of his past alcohol-induced misconduct in proportion to his will-
ingness to undergo and favorable response to treatment. ' 118
There are limits, however, to an employer's duty to reasonably ac-
commodate. The previous accommodation cases should be contrasted
110 Id. at 128.
111 Id. at 136.
112 Id. at 137.
113 Id. at 137-38.
114 600 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1985).
115 Id. at 759-60, 761-62.
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against Richardson v. United States Postal Service. 1 9 There, the United
States Postal Service discharged an alcoholic employee who had been
charged with assault with intent to kill. He had attempted to kill his wife
and himself. The plaintiff alleged that "if he had been accommodated
for his alcohol problem, his offense might not have happened, and thus
his difficulties arose from the Postal Service's inadequate attention to his
alcohol handicap."
120
The court held that Richardson's claim that the Postal Service failed
to reasonably accommodate him was without merit. 121 The court found
that Richardson was not discharged because of poor performance due to
alcohol abuse or for being an alcoholic, but for his criminal conduct in-
stead. The court noted that the Rehabilitation Act, "does not create a
duty to accommodate an alcoholic who ... commits an act which stand-
ing alone disqualifies him from service and is not entirely a manifestation
of alcohol abuse."1
22
Although these cases deal with the duty of reasonable accommoda-
tion under the Rehabilitation Act, the concepts of reasonable accommo-
dation and undue hardship under state laws are generally consistent with
those under the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, cases decided under
the Rehabilitation Act, like Whitlock,123 Walker,' 24 and Richardson,125 pro-
vide guidance even for employers not covered under the Rehabilitation
Act.
III. Substance Abuse Testing and Collective Bargaining Agreements
Unionized employees present additional problems for employers
seeking to impose substance abuse testing programs. Pursuant to the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a unionized employer has a duty
to bargain with the employees' representative over "wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment."'' 26 Although the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has not ruled on the issue, a substance
abuse testing program is likely to be considered a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining within the above definition.' 27 A clear and une-
quivocal waiver (in contract language and/or past practice) may permit
an employer to move forward without consultation with the union. How-
ever, it is generally advisable for the employer not to unilaterally imple-
ment a substance abuse testing program without bargaining. Such an
action may violate the NLRA.
In Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Co. 128 for example, the NLRB
119 613 F. Supp. 1213 (D.D.C. 1985).
120 Id. at 1215.
121 Id. at 1215-16.
122 Id. at 1216.
123 See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
126 National Labor Relations Act ch. 37, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982)).
127 Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1327, 1333 (7th Cir. 1978). cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 911
(1978).
128 273 N.L.R.B. 171 (1984),proceded by 282 N.L.R.B. 41 (1986).
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ruled that an employer violated the Labor Management Relations Act 129
when it unilaterally implemented a pulmonary function and audiometric
medical screening program. Employees who failed the test were denied
employment. The Board held that the employer's action violated the
NLRA. The employees' collective bargaining agreement in effect con-
tained specific restrictions on physical examinations. The employer had
unequivocally sought the right to establish the screening tests for a dif-
ferent purpose during registrations.'
30
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit vacated an injunction against a unilat-
erally implemented drug testing program in Brotherhood of Maintenance of
Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.131 The court
found that the program represented'only a minor change in working con-
ditions and analogized it to a standard medical examination aimed to en-
sure fitness for duty.
Accordingly, employers of union labor should review their existing
collective bargaining agreements to ascertain whether a substance abuse
testing program is expressly or impliedly prohibited. If such a program
is expressly or impliedly prohibited, at a minimum, good-faith bargaining
is required before such a program may be implemented. Even in the
absence of such a prohibition, however, it may be advisable to notify the
union in advance of implementing the program for legal and practical
reasons.
IV. Criteria for an Effective Substance Abuse Testing Program
Mindful of the legal implications under both federal and state law
previously discussed, this Article will now summarize the criteria for a
substance abuse testing program that would likely survive judicial
scrutiny.
A. Public Employer
1. Legitimate State Interest
In order to implement what is otherwise a search and seizure and/or
invasion of privacy under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, a gov-
ernment employer must have a legitimate interest for establishing a sub-
stance abuse testing program. Generally, such interest is found in the
public employer's duty to provide a safe working environment and en-
sure the public welfare. Those public employers (e.g., transportation),
whose "mission" is such that a mistake poses significant dangers to the
public welfare have the strongest interest in seeing that its employees are
"fit for duty." Substance abuse testing is one means of addressing that
interest.
2. Reasonable Suspicion
While some "across-the-board" or even random testing programs
129 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982).
130 273 N.L.R.B. 171.
131 802 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1986).
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have been upheld by the courts,132 unless there is a particularly compel-
ling state interest, such testing should be generally administered only
where there is reasonable suspicion, supported by objective evidence,
that a particular individual is using drugs and/or alcohol.
3. Equal Treatment
Since the chief purposes of substance abuse testing are "fitness for
duty" and safety, tests should be conducted for other medical conditions
that could impair an employee's ability to perform his job safely. Sub-
stance abuse should not be treated differently than other disabling
conditions.
4. Policy Statement
Testing should be conducted pursuant to a written, published pol-
icy. Applicants and employees should be apprised of the policy prior to
such testing. This notice, which may be accomplished during interview-
ing or orientation, will reduce expectations of privacy by individuals be-
ing tested.' 33 The policy should define:
(a) the standards of conduct to which employees are expected to
adhere;
(b) the methods of detection to be used and the circumstances
under which testing will be conducted; and
(c) the consequences of positive results or an individual's refusal
to be tested.
Care should be taken to minimize the "intrusion" into the individ-
ual's privacy and ensure the "reasonableness" of the search and seizure.
While it can be argued that urinalysis is less intrusive than blood test-
ing, 134 if the procedure involved unreasonably infringes upon an individ-
ual's expectation of privacy such that it "detracts from human dignity
and self respect," it will not pass constitutional muster. 35
The employer's policy should indicate that testing is a condition of
employment and specify the consequences of a positive result. The pol-
icy should provide reasonable accommodation, such as flexible work
hours, transfers, and employee assistance programs, although not impos-
ing undue hardship on the employer. Discipline also may be specified
where accommodation would impose undue hardship, or where the indi-
vidual refuses the accommodation offered and the substance abuse either
prevents performance of the essential functions of the position or poses a
direct threat to the property or safety of others. Refusal to test may re-
132 Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Rushton %.
Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 654 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987). See supra notes 23-28 and accompany-
ing text.
133 See Capua v. City of Plainfied, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D.N.J. 1986). See also supra notes 32-
40 and accompanying text.
134 See Shoemaker v. Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151 (D.N.J. 1985), aft'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), rert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
135 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F.Supp 380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated,




suit in the same degree of discipline, which can range from supervision
to termination, imposed for positive test results.
5. Consent
Knowing and voluntary consent to the testing by each individual
tested will substantially reduce constitutional concerns. Informed con-
sent cannot be accomplished without full prior disclosure of the pur-
poses of the testing, the methodology to be utilized, and the potential
consequences.13 6 It may be argued that a voluntary consent is impossi-
ble where submission to testing is made a condition of employment,
since such consent would be provided under duress. Nevertheless, this
Article still recommends use of consent forms in connection with such
testing.
6. Chain of Custody
The program should contain safeguards to ensure no break in the
chain of custody of the test specimen. This minimizes the opportunity
for error in the test result (e.g., misidentification of the sample) and speci-
men tampering. Safeguarding the chain of custody also reduces expo-




Careful selection of the testing laboratory and appropriate confirma-
tion (usually Gas Chromatography Mass Spectometry, GCMS) of a posi-
tive result will ensure reliability. This procedure will also reduce
exposure to denial of due process claims.
8. Confidentiality
Test results should be kept confidential. Only those management
officials with a "need to know" (usually those who participate in decision
making based on the results) and the individual tested should be af-
forded access to the results. 138
The Supreme Court has recognized a right of privacy in medical in-
formation. 39 In addition, in Shoemaker, the Third Circuit acknowledged
that medical disclosure resulting as a by-product of urinalysis created
grave confidentiality concerns.140 The Shoemaker court, however, upheld
urine testing ofjockeys as constitutionally permissible. The court based
its decision on the fact that such confidentiality concerns had been care-
fully addressed in statutory regulations strictly limiting the use and publi-
cation of test results so as to guarantee the jockeys' utmost
136 See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905). See also text accompanying notes 95-
96.
137 I'on Raab, 649 F. Supp at 389.
138 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(d)(1) (1986).
139 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
140 Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1144.
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confidentiality. 14 1 In contrast, the district court in Capua v. City of Plain-
field struck down urine testing as unconstitutional because the City had
not established any procedural safeguards for testing and, in particular,
confidentiality of the results. 42
B. Private Employer
The criteria for a succesful private employer program generally par-
allel those for public employer programs. However, the criteria are
somewhat more liberal in several material respects. Public employers
generally may not test absent reasonable suspicion. Private employers
(in the absence of state action), on the other hand, may conduct across-
the-board testing (even absent reasonable suspicion) without the consti-
tutional implications discussed above. Private employers are not subject
to the limitations imposed by the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 43
Thus, absent other laws, contracts or judicially-created restric-
tions, 1 44 private employers may test all job applicants and all employees
on a regular basis. Therefore, of course, they may test also individual
employees based on reasonable suspicion. However, private employers
should be careful to avoid singling out individuals of protected racial or
ethnic groups for drug testing or exposure to disparate treatment claims
will result. 145 Further, while random testing by private employers may
be spared constitutional scrutiny, such testing is more likely to result in
the disproportionate testing of protected groups. Moreover, it may be
destructive of employee morale (and, hence, productivity) in some com-
panies. Therefore, random testing should be carefully considered before
implementation.
Substance abuse is a societal problem of crisis proportions. The
workplace is no exception. Substance abuse testing, within the legal cri-
teria discussed in this Article, is but one way an employer (and thereby,
society) can address the problem. Testing programs are not a cure; but
they can be a form of damage control.
141 Id. at 1144.
142 643 F. Supp 1507. 1521 (D.NJ. 1986).
143 Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465
(1921).
144 Other legal theories, such as negligence, wrongful discharge and defamation of character
have not been considered in this Article but may impact on the implementation or administration of
a substance abuse program.
145 New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (disparate impact theory); Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977) (disparate treatment theory).
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